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Abstract
The number of people on social networks has grown
exponentially. Users share very large volumes of per-
sonal informations and content every days. This
content could be tagged with geo-spatial and tem-
poral coordinates that may be considered sensitive
for some users. While there is clearly a demand
for users to share this information with each other,
there is also substantial demand for greater control
over the conditions under which their information is
shared. Content published in a geo-aware social net-
works (GeoSN) often involves multiple users and it is
often accessible to multiple users, without the pub-
lisher being aware of the privacy preferences of those
users. This makes difficult for GeoSN users to con-
trol which information about them is available and
to whom it is available. Thus, the lack of means to
protect users privacy scares people bothered about
privacy issues. This paper addresses a particular pri-
vacy threats that occur in GeoSNs: the Co-location
privacy threat. It concerns the availability of infor-
mation about the presence of multiple users in a same
locations at given times, against their will. The chal-
lenge addressed is that of supporting privacy while
still enabling useful services.
1 Introduction
The great availability of social network services and
mobile devices with internet connectivity and in-
tograted GPS enable Geo-aware Social Networks
(GeoSNs). Several different existing GeoSNs allow
users to share their location (frequently, their exact
location on a map) and other types of information,
but have extremely limited privacy settings. Typi-
cally, they only allow users to specify location infor-
mations with higher granularity (for example, a city),
or a list of individuals with whom they would be will-
ing to share their locations at any time [10]. While
there is clearly a demand for users to share this in-
formation with each other, there is also substantial
demand for greater control over the conditions under
which their information is shared, and a number of
recent papers demonstrate that individuals are con-
cerned about privacy in this domain [1, 8, 9].
Thus, privacy in social networks is a hot topic, and
reports indicate that an increasing number of users
are concerned about privacy issue, enough to leave
GeoSNs [3]. In GeoSNs, exact locations of users are
published and can be red by multiple users. Thus,
potentially untrusted entities may exploit these to
infer sensitive information about the users and make
some unwanted focused actions. Recent studies has
been performed on different aspects of user privacy
that are potentially at risk [2, 7]. These works exam-
ine specific privacy threats and try to give possible
solutions. In particular the Location Privacy, the Ab-
sence Privacy and the Co-Location Privacy threats
are araised. While the first two problems are widely
discussed in [2], the Co-Location Privacy still remains
unexplored, as far as we know.
In most GeoSNs, an adversary might be able to ob-
serve the presence of multiple users in the same place
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and some users consider such co-location to be sen-
sitive. Thus, disclosing this information to an adver-
sary constitutes a co-location privacy violation. None
of the currently known GeoSNs supports co-location
privacy [7], and specifying privacy preferences related
to co-location can be challenging.
The objective of this paper is to explore this prob-
lem and provide preliminary techniques that enable
users to specify their privacy preferences and then en-
force these preferences. Our approach is based on the
studies performed in [2]. We apply meta-data gener-
alization in order to make not possible for any set
of resources violate any users preference, also taking
into account constraints on the maximum velocity of
user movement. The proposed technique enforce the
co-location privacy by computing appropriate spatial
enlargement (where possible) in resource publication.
Although privacy has been studied extensively in
location-based services and social networks [6, 4, 5,
11], we are not aware of any studies that consider
co-location privacy in the GeoSN setting.
Finally, some existing GeoSN services offer some
form of control of the geo-tags of resources, e.g., by
enabling tags at coarse granularities such as the city
level (e.g., Google Latitude), but much finer controls
are necessary to avoid the privacy threats considered
in this paper. The contributions of the paper are the
following:
• Formalization of co-location privacy threat in
GeoSN and adversary attacks.
• Proposals of means of expressing privacy prefer-
ences.
• A privacy preserving technique that guarantees
the enforcement of user preferences.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion 2 formally characterizes the co-location privacy
threat in GeoSNs, the adversary model and how users
can specify their privacy preferences; Section 3 de-
scribes the algorithm of the proposed GeoSN privacy
preservation technique; Section 4 discuss the applica-
bility of our technique to existing GeoSNs; Section 5
reports our conclusion.
2 Problem Formalization
In this section, we formally describe the assumed
GeoSN service resources and the privacy threats we
address. Then we define how users can express their
privacy preferences, the adversary model, and suffi-
cient conditions for satisfying a user’s privacy prefer-
ences.
2.1 GeoSN Resources
A GeoSN service allows its users to publish a resource
(e.g., a picture, a text message, a check-in) tagged
with the current location and time, as well as a set
of users related to the resource. A resource is ei-
ther automatically tagged (e.g. an integrated GPS
can provide location and time), or manually tagged.
Since resources and their tags become available to
other users as well as to service providers, we are
concerned with the privacy violations that the publi-
cation can lead to. Formally, a resource r is a tuple:
〈U, T, S,C〉 (1)
where the elements are meta-data tags, with r.U
being a set of identifiers of users, r.S being a spa-
tial tag, r.T being a temporal tag and r.C being the
resource itself. In the following, when referring to a
resource r, we assume that all the users in r.U are in
the location r.S at the time r.T . We denote the user
that makes r as owner(r). Note that:
r.U ⊇ owner(r) ∧
∀u ∈ r.U \ {owner(r)}, friend(owner(r), u) (2)
where friend is a “friendship” relation between
users. Location of a resource could be recorded at
the finest available resolution (a point in the appro-
priate domain) or with higher granularity, that is a
larger area. Time of a resource is a timestamp with
date and time. In this paper we refer to a real time
publication model. This means that each resources
has an accurate timestamp and users can’t publish
resources referring to the past. This model may in-
clude for example proximity services, micro-blogging,
and social navigation services. We denote the set of
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resources of the GeoSN as R ⊆ R (the resources do-
main).
In accordance to a consolidated idea [2], we based
our approach on the generalization of the resources
before publication. In particular, when we identify a
resource r that violate the privacy of a user (or a set
of users) we apply a function g that takes a resource
r and generate a resource r’ that doesn’t violate the
privacy of any users. Formally, a generalization func-
tion is g : R −→ R:
g(r = 〈U, T, S,C〉) = (r′ = 〈U ′, T, S′, C〉) (3)
where U ′ ⊆ U and S ⊆ S′. The function g(r) takes
into account the privacy preferences expressed by the
users and try to make a new resource that does not
violate these preferences.
In the following we recall two basic concepts (first
introduced in [2]) that will be used in the next sec-
tions. A resource r is reachable from another re-
source r′ if each spacial point in r are reachable
from some spacial points in r′, in the time interval
|r.T − r′.T | moving with an acceptable speed. For-
mally:
Definition 1 (Reachability). Given a velocity Vmax
and two resources r, r′, we say that r is reachable
from r′ if:
∀s ∈ r.S, ∃s′ ∈ r′.S : d(s, s
′)
|r.T − r′.T | < Vmax (4)
where d(s, s’) compute the distance between the two
spacial points and Vmax is the maximum acceptable
medium speed for a user.
Two resources are independent if they have not
users in common or if their spatial distance is small
when compared with the temporal distance. For-
mally:
Definition 2 (Independence). Given two resources
〈r, r′〉 ∈ R×R, we say that r and r′ are independent
(and we denote it with r ⊥ r′) if:
r.U ∩ r′.U = ∅ ∨
(r reachable from r′ ∧ r′ reachable from r) (5)
r.Sr'.S
ext(r.S, r'.T - r.T)
Figure 1: Consistency of resources.
Independence of resources ensures that each re-
source doesn’t restrict the informations given by any
other resources. This property allows to avoid a par-
ticular attack from the adversary. For example, sup-
pose that in Fig. 1 are represented the spatial infor-
mations of two consecutive resources that involve the
user u. The ext function computes the area in which
any user located in r.S at the time r.T , can be located
at the time r′.T (considering the maximum speed of
users). Thus, the adversary can infer that only a sub-
set of r′.S is a possible location for u. we will clarify
the need of independence of resources in the section
2.4
2.2 Co-Location Privacy Threat
We consider geographical location and temporal lo-
cation as sensitive information that sometimes users
want to maintain private. When an adversary can
associates user’s identity with these kind of informa-
tions without the user’s consensus, a privacy violation
has occurred. This paper focuses on the Co-Location
privacy problem. In this section we give a descrip-
tion of this privacy threat and we give a description
of how users could describe their privacy preferences
in order to protect themselves from this problem.
A typical Co-Location privacy threat example is a
user that doesn’t want to let people know that (s)he
is located in a specific place at a specific time with
her/his secret lover. For instance, imagine that Alice
and Bob are secret lovers and they having a drink to-
gether in a pub. They don’t want to let other people
know their secret meeting, but Bob sees his friend
Charlie that updates his status, writing “just met
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Bob at a pub!” and tagging the post with 12:02 p.m.,
24 West 35th Street. A bit later Alice sees her friend
Juliette that updates her status, writing “just met Al-
ice at a pub!” and tagging the post with 12:10 p.m.,
24 West 35th Street. A user with access to both posts
(e.g., a friend of Bob and Alice) can infer that Alice
and Bob are co-located without their consensus.
The disclosure of a co-location can occur in two
different ways: a direct way and an indirect way.
The direct disclosure occur when a single resource r
co-locates a set of users U that don’t want to be co-
located. The indirect disclosure occur when a pair of
resource r, r′ co-locate two different subset of U in a
“small” area and with “small” time difference (this is
the case presented in the above example). We discuss
what we mean with “small” in section 2.4.
This privacy threat can be addressed by offering
the users means of controlling the location informa-
tion to be disclosed. This means include different
kinds of privacy preferences that users can express.
We model the preferences for avoid co-location pri-
vacy threat for a user u as a tuple ϕ:
〈E,A, T,D〉 (6)
where ϕ.E and ϕ.A are sets of users, ϕ.T is a time
interval and ϕ.D is a spatial distance. In particular,
• ϕ.E is called Excluding Set and represent the
set of users with whom u doesn’t want to be co-
located.
• ϕ.A is called Adversary Set. Co-location of u
with any users in ϕ.E is allowed if the co-location
includes any users in ϕ.A as well (we’ll explain
better this concept in the next section).
• ϕ.T is the time interval in which u doesn’t
want to be co-located. ϕ.T have a starting
time (tstart) and an ending time (tend). ϕ.T is
bounded (tend − tstart ≤ Tmax).
• ϕ.D is the minimum distance within u doesn’t
want to be co-located. ϕ.D is bounded (ϕ.D ≤
Dmax).
For instance, a possible co-location privacy prefer-
ence for Alice could be “Don’t reveal my co-location
with Bob in less than 50 meters and during the
evenings, unless Bob’s wife (Mary) is there as well.”.
This privacy preference can be represented by a re-
curring (infinite) set of ϕ tuple of the type:
〈 Bob, Mary, 11th July ’11 (19:00 p.m.) - 11th July
’11 (23:00 p.m.), 50 m. 〉
〈 Bob, Mary, 12th July ’11 (19:00 p.m.) - 12th July
’11 (23:00 p.m.), 50 m. 〉
〈 Bob, Mary, 13th July ’11 (19:00 p.m.) - 13th July
’11 (23:00 p.m.), 50 m. 〉
and so on...
starting from the day in which Alice has set this
preference. We indicate the set of the privacy settings
of the user u with Φ(u).
Intuitively, when a user want to make a resource r
that violates this preference we apply a generalization
function g to r that obfuscate the meta-data of r,
in order to preserve the privacy of Alice and Bob.
Obfuscation in our case means the enlargement of the
area expressed by r.S or the removal of some user in
r.U , so that an adversary is not able to infer exact
informations about the victims.
2.3 Adversary Model
The adversary is a user of the GeoSN that want to
use published resources to infer sensitive informations
about other users (victims). We assume that the ad-
versary has access to all the resources published by
all the users. This conservative approach is not a re-
alistic context but it has two important effects: (a)
if the co-location privacy is preserved against an ad-
versary that has access to all the resources of the
GeoSN, it is also preserved against an adversary that
has a restricted access to the resources; (b) this ap-
proach permits to avoid any chance by an adversary
to exploit future friendship relations (or friendship re-
lations not in common with the victims) in order to
gain access to additional sensitive informations about
users. We also assume that the adversary knows the
generalization technique used to generalize resources
before publication, but (s)he doesn’t know the pri-
vacy preferences of other users because these infor-
mations are only available if (s)he has access to other
accounts (and we assume that (s)he doesn’t have it).
When a resource r ∈ R states that a user u is
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located in the area r.S at the time r.T , the adversary
can assume a uniform probability distribution of user
location, that is:
∀ s ∈ r.S, P (loc(u) = s) = p (7)
where loc(u) indicates the exact spatial location
of the user u. Instead ∀t 6= r.T , the adversary can
assume that u can be located in a larger area:
{
P (loc(u) = s) > 0, if s ∈ ext(r.S, |t− r.T |)
P (loc(u) = s) = 0, if s /∈ ext(r.S, |t− r.T |) (8)
with ext being the function defined in section 2.1.
This means that we consider not null the probability
that u is located in a larger area if u, moving with an
acceptable medium speed, can be in this area after
the time interval |t− r.T |.
Concerning the co-location privacy of a user u, we
consider it as preserved if ∀ ϕ ∈ Φ(u), the adversary
doesn’t have any chance to consider null the proba-
bility that u is at least ϕ.D far from any users in ϕ.E
in the temporal interval ϕ.T .
Definition 3 (Co-Location Privacy preservation of
a user u). The Co-Location Privacy of u is preserved
if:
∀ϕ ∈ Φ(u), ∀ t ∈ ϕ.T, ∀ e ∈ ϕ.E
P (d(u, e) > ϕ.D) > 0
(9)
and this holds as long as doesn’t exists any set of
resources that makes null this probability.
Definition 4 (Co-Location Privacy preservation). A
GeoSN preserve the Co-Location Privacy if: ∀u, the
Co-Location Privacy of u is preserved.
However, even any set of resources in R doesn’t
violate the co-location privacy of a user u, a sly ad-
versary (that know how the principle of the gener-
alization technique works) could try to make some
fake resource in order to infer the privacy preference
of u. For instance, imagine that Mary (the jealous
wife of Bob) suspects a secret meeting between Bob
and Alice, for this evening, and she want to enhance
her suspect by discovering sensitive privacy settings
of Bob in his favorite GeoSN. Mary tries to make
a resource r = 〈“Mary,Bob,Alice”, “Today, 22 :
30p.m.”, S, C〉 that means: “Mary is co-located in C
with Alice and Bob”. The GeoSN notify Mary that
if she want to make this resource she have to set an
area that guarantee more distance between users, be-
cause she is violating the privacy of someone. With
this information, Mary can exclude that she is violat-
ing her privacy (she hasn’t any privacy setting) and
the privacy of any other user outside Alice and Bob,
because there isn’t any other resource that co-locate
other users with Bob or Alice at the time she want
to make the resource (She has a complete view on
R). Thus, Mary can enhance her suspect of a secret
meeting between Alice and Bob.
This example shows why we introduced the
Adversary Set in the privacy settings. If a user u
knows who could be a potentially adversary, (s)he
can put her/him in the Adversary Set. The effect
is that any resource r that include a user in ϕ.A is
allowed even if r violates the privacy preference ex-
pressed by ϕ.
Note that a sly adversary could exploit her/his in-
clusion in the Adversary Set for a particular kind of
attack. For instance, imagine that Mary (the jealous
wife of Bob) suspects a secret meeting between Bob
and Alice, and she also suspects her inclusion in the
Adversary Set of Bob’ privacy preferences. If ex-
ist some resources that locate Bob somewhere, Mary
could makes a fake resource that locate herself near
Bob. Thus, any co-location of Bob with Alice (near
Mary) is allowed and Mary can enhance her suspects
if they occur. Although this kind of attack is possible,
we believe that it’s difficult to succesfully accomplish,
due to the need of multiple necessary conditions for
its achievement. Moreover, in contrast to the previ-
ous attack, the pubblication of fake resources is re-
quired, then the victims can easily became aware of
this fact.
2.4 Co-Location Privacy Preservation
In this section, we identify a set of sufficient condi-
tions that R must satisfy in order to guarantee the co-
location privacy preservation. These conditions iden-
tify a set of possible scenarios that must be avoided in
5
order to have not null the probability of co-locating
a user u with an Excluding set E in a time interval
T with a maximum distance greater than D.
As mentioned before, the co-location can occur in
two ways: a direct way and a indirect way. In the
following we formalize these concepts.
Definition 5 (Direct Co-Location). A Direct Co-
Location of u considering ϕ ∈ Φ(u), is a resource r
∈ R:
u ∈ r.U ∧ r.U ∩ ϕ.E 6= ∅ ∧ r.U ∩ ϕ.A = ∅ (10)
and we indicate it with the syntax: r → (u, ϕ).
A direct co-location must be avoided if it reveals
that u and any user in ϕ.E can’t be co-located with
a distance greater than ϕ.D in the time interval ϕ.T .
This leads us to define the validity concept for a
direct co-location.
Definition 6 (Valid Direct Co-Location). A Valid
Direct Co-Location of u considering ϕ ∈ Φ(u), is a
resource r ∈ R:
r → (u, ϕ) ∧ r.T /∈ ϕ.T ∧
1
2
· ϕ.D|r.T − n(ϕ.T )| < Vmax
(11)
where n(ϕ.T ) compute the nearest t ∈ ϕ.T to r.T that
is: t ∈ ϕ.T : |r.T − t| < |r.T − t′| ∀t′ 6= t ∈ ϕ.T .
The last condition condition of (11) states that if a
co-location occurs before or after ϕ.T (Fig. 2), u and
any users in ϕ.E have the possibility of being located
with a distance greater than ϕ.D in the time inter-
val ϕ.T because they have enough time to leave each
other, if they move with acceptable medium speed.
In Fig. 2, we report the spatial information of a re-
source as one-dimensional data. In a real context it
would be a two-dimensional data, but this doesn’t
affect the semantics of our examples.
Definition 7 (Indirect Co-Location). An Indirect
Co-Location of u considering ϕ ∈ Φ(u), is a pair of
resource 〈r, r′〉 ∈ R×R:
r 6= r′ ∧ u ∈ r.U ∧ r′.U ∩ ϕ.E 6= ∅ ∧
(r.U ∪ r′.U) ∩ ϕ.A = ∅ ∧
ϕ.D − d(r.S − r′.S)
|r.T − r′.T | > Vmax
(12)
Space
time
r.T
r.S
r
(b)
Space
time
n(r.T)r.T
r.S
r
(a)
n(r.T)
.T.T
Figure 2: Direct Co-Location.
where d(r.S,r’.S) compute the maximum distance be-
tween the two location. We indicate it with the syn-
tax: 〈r, r′〉 → (u, ϕ).
The last condition of (12) states that the two re-
sources are close in time. This permits us to con-
sider the users involved in the co-location in an area
smaller than ϕ.D at the time max(r.T, r′.T ).
As a direct co-location, a indirect co-location must
be avoided if it reveals that u and any user in ϕ.E
can’t be co-located with a distance greater than ϕ.D
in the time interval ϕ.T .
Definition 8 (Valid Indirect Co-Location). A Valid
Inirect Co-Location of u considering ϕ ∈ Φ(u), is a
pair of resource 〈r, r′〉 ∈ R×R:
〈r, r′〉 → (u, ϕ) ∧
[min(r.T, r′.T ),max(r.T, r′.T )] ∩ ϕ.T 6= ∅ ∧
1
2
· ϕ.D − d(ext(S, |r.T − r
′.T |), S′)
|max(r.T, r′.T )− n(max(r.T, r′.T ))| < Vmax
(13)
where S is the spatial information associated to
the resource with temporal information equals to
min(r.T, r′.T ), and S′ is the spatial information as-
sociated to the resource with temporal information
equals to max(r.T, r′.T ).
The second condition in (13) states that the time
of the co-location must not overlap with the time
interval ϕ.T . The last condition states that if the
co-location occur before or after ϕ.T (Fig. 3), u and
any users in ϕ.E have the possibility (like in the di-
rect co-location) of being located with more distance
6
Space
time
n(r'.T)r.T
r.S
r
r'
r'.T
r'.S
(a)
Space
time
n(r.T) r.T
r.S
r
r'
r'.T
r'.S
(b)
.T .T
Figure 3: Indirect Co-Location.
than ϕ.D in the time interval ϕ.T . For example, the
indirect co-location in Fig. 3 (a) is valid if at the time
r′.T , dmax(r.r′) < ϕ.D and the involved users can
depart for at least ϕ.D within n(ϕ.T ), moving with
an acceptable medium speed.
An important property of a valid co-location
(direct or indirect) considering p, is that if we don’t
take into account any other resource, the informa-
tions given by the co-location are not sufficient to
determine that ∀e ∈ ϕ.E the distance between u and
e is not greater than ϕ.D in the time interval ϕ.T .
This implies that: ∀t ∈ ϕ.T ∀e ∈ ϕ.E, P (d(u, e) >
ϕ.D) > 0.
In a set of dependent resources, a valid co-locaiton
can still violate the privacy of a user u. For instance,
let ϕ = 〈{e}, ∅, T,D〉 be a a privacy preference for
the user u. The Fig. 4 shows two valid indirect co-
location of u considering ϕ. But if we consider the
gray circle (the area reachable from r.S in the time
interval t) we can infer that, at the time r′.T , u can
be located only in the area with black stripes, and
this violate the privacy of u.
Note that the given example is not valid if we con-
sider a set of independent resources. This lead us to
define two sufficient condition that R must verify in
order to preserve the co-location privacy, that are:
(a) ∀〈r, r′〉 ∈ R×R, r ⊥ r′
(b) ∀u ∀p ∈ P (u) ∀ C Co-Location (direct or
indirect) of u considering p, C is valid.
Whenever a resource r is added to R, it must be
independent from any other resource in R and it must
not generate any invalid co-locations. If an invalid
co-location occurs, we apply a generalization function
r.Sr'.S
ext(r.S, t)
r''
.D
r'T - r.T = t
e in r''.U  
u in r.U  
u in r'.U  
r'T > r.T
Figure 4: Privacy violation in a set of dependent re-
sources.
g defined in section 2.1
3 Co-Location Privacy Preser-
vation Algorithm
In this section we propose a sequential algorithm for
preserve the co-location privacy in a GeoSN mod-
eled as described in the previous sections. This algo-
rithm takes in input a set of independent resources
R that preserve the co-location privacy (the GeoSN
resources) and a resource r, and it tries to add r to
R ensuring that the new set of resources preserve the
co-location privacy as well. The algorithm is based
on the conditions (a), (b) given in the section 2.4.
Note that in the section 2.2 we state that the set
of privacy settings for a user u can be infinite. This
problem can be easily avoided by extending the defi-
nition of a privacy preference tuple, for example by
adding a frequency flag that could assume a value
among: “every day”, “every week”, “every year”.
Before the execution of the co-location privacy
preservation algorithm, r is pre-processed to make
it independent from any other resource in R. This
topic is widely discussed in [2], in the “WYSE Tech-
nique” section. In particular [2] proposes two dif-
ferent algorithms, called CountryCloakWyse and
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ClockWyse that apply a generalization on the spa-
tial or temporal dimensions, respectively. Since in
this paper, we use a real-time publication model,
only the CountryCloakWyse algorithm is suitable
for our purpose.
Algorithm 1 Co-Location Privacy Preservation Al-
gorithm (1)
Require: R set of independent resources,
r resource : R∪{r} set of independent resources
Ensure: r not invalid direct co− location
for all u ∈ r.U do
for all ϕ ∈ Φ(u) do
if ¬isV alidCoLoc(r, u, ϕ) then
r.U ← r.U \ ϕ.E
end if
end for
end for
After a resource is guaranteed to be independent
from every other existing resource, the co-location
privacy preservation algorithm is executed. This al-
gorithm is composed by two different parts. The first
part (Alg. 1) is responsible for modifying r if an
invalid direct co-location occurs. In this case, only
users erasure is applicable.
Instead the second part (Alg. 2) is responsible
for avoiding invalid indirect co-locations. The first
step of Alg. 2 is the computation of the Co-Location
Graph that is a data structure used to support the
indirect co-location identification. It is defined as fol-
lows:
Definition 9 (Co-Location Graph). A Co-Location
Graph is a not direct graph G=〈V,E〉:
• V is the set of vertices and represents a set of
resources.
• E ⊆ V × V is the set of edges that link near
resources. The edges are enriched with a distance
information d (maximum distance between two
vertices).
A co-location graph connects any two resources if
they are geo-located with a small distance. The co-
location graph building, in the Alg. 2, starts consider-
ing the resource r, and ∀r′ ∈ R : d(r.S, r′.S) < Dmax,
the building process creates an edge between r and r′
enriched with d(r.S, r′.S). At the end of the process,
the data structure G is similar to the graph showed
in Fig. 5.
Algorithm 2 Co-Location Privacy Preservation Al-
gorithm (2)
Require: R set of independent resources,
r resource : R∪{r} set of independent resources
Ensure: ∀r′ ∈ R, 〈r, r′〉 not invalid indirect co −
location.
committed← false
G← buildCoLocationGraph(r)
for all 〈r, r′〉 ∈ G.E do
for all u ∈ r.U ∪ r′.U do
for all ϕ ∈ Φ(u) do
if ¬isV alidCoLoc(〈r, r′〉, u, ϕ) then
S′ ← enlargement(r.S, r′.S, ϕ.D)
if S′ 6= null then
r.S ← r.S + S′
else
if (r.U\u\ϕ.E) ⊇ owner(r) then
r.U ← (r.U \ u \ ϕ.E)
else
Deny r. return
end if
end if
end if
end for
end for
end for
sync
G′ ← buildCoLocationGraph(r)
if G = G′ then
R← R ∪ {r}
committed← true
end if
end sync
After the co-location graph building is done, the
algorithm iterates for all possible invalid indirect
co-locations and avoids them by obfuscating the
geographical meta-data given by r. The function
enlargement(r.S, r′.S, ϕ.D) computes an area S′ :
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∃〈s, s′〉 ∈ (r.S + S′)× r′.S : d(s, s′) = ϕ.D ∧
∀r′′ ∈ R, r′′ ⊥ 〈r.U, r.T, r.S + S′, r.C〉 (14)
If such an area can’t be computed, the algorithm
applies a users erasure. If also users erasure can’t
also be performed, the resource r is denied. At the
end of the Alg. (2), if there aren’t new involved re-
sources in the co-location graph G, the resource r is
atomically committed to the whole resources set R,
otherwise (committed = false) the algorithm must
be re executed. Atomicity is required because multi-
ple instance of the Alg. (2) can run at the same time
due to multiple resource publication from different
users at the same time.
After the Alg. (1) and (2) are executed, the user
is notified about the changes made on r before the
pubblication.
Dmaxd1
d2
d3
r
d4
d5
r1
r2
r3
r4
r5
Figure 5: Co-Location Graph.
4 Applicability to Existing
GeoSNs
In some GeoSNs, the temporal or the spatial di-
mension is less crucial and thus it can be general-
ized if a privacy concern exists. If the resources of
a GeoSN doesn’t require exact location but require
real-time publishing, the technique presented in this
paper could be applied in order to preserve the co-
location privacy. For instance, Twitter doesn’t re-
quire that users publish an exact location and they
can generalize it to a coarser one (such as a neigh-
borhood or city). In contrast, a tweet’s utility gen-
erally relies heavily on its publication in real time.
Other services require using an exact location, but
resources doesn’t need to be published instantly. In
this case the proposed technique must be extended in
order to apply a temporal cloaking instead of a spatial
cloaking. Finally, for services that require both high
spatial and temporal accuracy, applying any spatio-
temporal cloaking techniques wouldn’t be possible.
For these services, we can obfuscate the set of users
involved in resources by the erasure of some of them.
Encryption is also a potentially effective solution.
In the case of a GeoSN allows to omit the geotag,
the co-location privacy preservation is more difficult
due to an additional kind of attack that the adversary
could perform to infer the geo-location of a user. For
instance, the adversary may infer the location of a
user u, if exists a resource r that co-locates u with
another user u′ without geographical information and
another resource r′ (with a small temporal difference
from r) locates u′ in a certain place.
In [7] an overview of the features of existing
GeoSNs is given. We can observe that our technique
is suitable for services like: Twitter, Google Latitude,
Google Buzz, Grindr and Loopt.
5 Conclusion
Since social networking services continue to prolifer-
ate, there is an increasing need of preserving users
privacy. This paper addresses a particular privacy
threat that is the co-location privacy. We propose
a way for expressing privacy settings of users and a
study of how they can be preserved in the context of
“real-time publishing” GeoSNs. The paper formal-
izes the setting, provides a way for easily defining
privacy preferences, and provides a technique that
generalizes the tags of resources so that these remain
useful while ensuring that the privacy preferences are
preserved. This technique exploit spatial general-
ization or users erasure (where the first one is not
possible). In this paper we take into account only
meta-data of resources to preserve users privacy, but
the content of a resource itself could raises privacy
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threats. For example a photo can co-locates some
users against their will. Future research can be done
in this direction to face this problem. Moreover, the
proposed technique can be extended in order to face
the co-location privacy threat in GeoSNs that don’t
require real-time publishing. In this case, temporal
cloaking of resources is also possible.
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